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Abstract—Driverless vehicles are expected to form the founda-
tion of future connected transport infrastructure. A key weakness
of connected vehicles is their vulnerability to physical-proximity
attacks such as sensor saturation attacks. It is natural to
study whether such attacks can be used to disrupt swarms of
autonomous vehicles used as part of a large fleet providing
taxi and courier delivery services. In this paper, we start to
examine the strategic options available to attackers and defenders
(autonomous-fleet operators) in such conflicts. We find that
attackers have the upper hand in most cases and are able to carry
out crippling denial-of-service attacks on fleets, by leveraging the
inherent deficiencies of road networks identified by techniques
from graph analysis. Experimental results on ten cities using real-
world courier traces shows that most cities will require upgraded
infrastructure to defend driverless vehicles against denial-of-
service attacks. We found several hidden costs that impact
equipment designers and operators of driverless vehicles — not
least, that road-networks need to be redesigned for robustness
against attacks thus raising some fundamental questions about
the benefits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The area of driverless vehicles has seen rapid developments
in the last few years. Substantial industrial investment in
driverless technology has been made in the wake of recent
advances in sensing and computational control systems. While
the transformative impact of such automation has been recog-
nised, the trust implications of their deployment have yet to
be adequately discussed.
While driverless vehicles were conceived nearly a century
ago, it was not until the application of statistical machine
learning combined with control automation, that the ideas
crystalised into reality. Therefore it is natural to ask whether it
is possible to apply adversarial statistics to also disrupt fleets
of driverless vehicles at scale. In the context of fleets, we
are concerned about the availability of driverless as the key
security property, followed by authenticity of control, integrity,
and lastly confidentiality of information. Our key concern is
availability, because it is the most easily influenced property
— an attacker who jams the optical and acoustic channels
can induce an emergency stop resulting in a denial-of-service
attack. The question however is, can this be done at scale?
Our experiments, carried out within the first systematic study
of the area, suggest that this may indeed be the case.
Driverless vehicles collect sensory input via lidars, radar,
visual-range cameras, and ultrasound sensors – all of which
are vulnerable to signal saturation attacks [16]. Directional
ultrasound acoustic jammers consist of an array of powered
ultrasound transducers whose output is focused into a narrow
beam with a distance range of a few tens of meters [21]. These
were developed with (a short range) for medical imaging and
(medium range) for sound entertainment systems [18]. Such
precision engineering tools can be repurposed as attack tools
to shine an acoustic spotlight to stealthily saturate vehicles
deploying sonars. To further compromise safety, an attacker
can combine signal saturation with illusion attacks [16]. Illu-
sion attacks cause the information available to the car prior
to jamming to be undependable thus causing the vehicle to
execute an unsafe stop.
While disabling a single driverless vehicle might not im-
pact the bottom line, doing so at scale certainly will. It is
therefore natural to investigate whether individual attacks can
be scaled into a service denial attack on an entire fleet of
driverless vehicles. We study the robot operator’s decision-
making behaviour in response to economic costs of service-
denial attacks in general (radio jamming, battery exhaustion)
with a focus on the behavioural aspects underlying operator
response. This paper is not concerned with the fulfillment of
security properties (technical jamming attacks and defences)
in this paper.
In a real-world scenario, a driverless (fully autonomous)
vehicle used to courier packages to customers would stop
at the delivery address and alert the recipient. The recipient
then walks over to the vehicle, and types in a PIN to retrieve
their package. Such driverless cars are expected to be used as
part of a last-mile logistics infrastructure to transport people
(driverless taxis), deliver packages, and fresh food at strict
timelines. These are applications with trustworthiness require-
ments. Indeed, online super-retailers are hoping their lastmile
problem could be solved by a fleet of driverless vehicles
they directly control, as opposed to the patchy ecosystem of
multiple providers which is the current norm.
As a more theoretical example but one that accurately
captures the threat model, consider a courier who has been
tasked with delivering bags of cocaine by a dealer. The courier
sets up secret appointments to drop off the shipments at pre-
determined locations. The courier must select a route visiting
all the locations and returning back to the starting point,
whilst ensuring minimum expense and maximising safety of
the goods. The courier is at risk of attacks from rival dealers
who may wish to disrupt delivery, steal goods, or worse. For
easier reading, in the rest of the paper, we refer to a driverless
vehicle as a courier.
We evaluated various attack and defense strategies on 12
different road networks which correspond to popular cities
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2around the world in which driverless courier vehicles are
consider viable. We show that in all cases Nash equilibriums
exist. However, network effects favour the attackers. Attacks
can disrupt an entire fleet of driverless courier vehicles at the
scale of a city with just a few of attack units. In some cases
the defenses significantly countered an attack strategy, whereas
in specific cases, the defense strategy in fact performs worse
than if no strategy was employed.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop the first
comprehensive analysis of the attack resilience of driverless
vehicles to denial-of-service attacks on their sensory input.
Instead of analysing specific attacks we develop a generic
framework for this purpose: we consider a zero-sum multi-
player hider-seeker game where the couriers are the hiders
and the attacker coordinates one or more attack units called
seekers. The couriers wish to choose optimal routing strategies,
that minimise transport time. On the other hand, the attacker
aims to choose optimal attack locations to ambush as many
couriers as possible. We consider a number of attack and
defense strategies motivated by the science of networks, and
develop a new understanding of which attack and defense
strategies result in stable equilibriums, and the implications
of these findings on the hidden costs of a robust infrastructure
which is safe for driverless vehicles.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a courier delivery system where numerous driver-
less vehicles deliver packages for purchases from an online
super-retailer. Once an online order is placed, it is added
to the daily schedule of deliveries, called a tour, on a fleet
of driverless vehicles, individually called a courier. This can
be represented using a graph G(V,E), where G is the road
network with vertex set V corresponding to physical addresses
and edgeset E corresponding to roads between them. Each
courier starts from the warehouse location W ∈ V and
ends with the warehouse location, with numerous stops at
customer delivery locations C1, . . . , Cl ∈ V . The goal of the
couriers is to optimise both their security and transportation
time. Accordingly, each courier, modeling a hider, chooses
a routing strategy which minimises the probability of attack
whilst simultaneously minimising the delivery time (and cost).
Each courier’s pure strategies are all the possible paths starting
from origin through all the destination nodes and returning
back to the origin.
The attacker’s goal is to ambush as many couriers as
possible. To achieve this, the attacker positions multiple mobile
attack units each modeling a seeker on key routes (edges
S ⊂ E) of the road network in a coordinated manner, as
depicted in figure 1. When an attack unit comes within the
physical proximity of a driverless vehicle, it launches a signal-
saturation attacks. A signal saturation attack is a class of
targeted attacks that focuses on the sensory inputs of a courier
vehicle and orchestrates a denial-of-service by jamming the
sensor. It can take the form of targeted attacks focusing on
one or more of the following: lasers targeting the Lidar or
CCD/CMOS (visual camera) sensors, or jamming the GPS,
sonar, or other sensory inputs. A successful ambush can
Fig. 1: Multi-party Network Interdiction
result in disabling the courier until it is towed out of the
attacker’s proximity and possibly rebooted, hence leading to
increased delays (transportation time). The attacker’s goal is to
maximise the amount of delays induced in order to maximise
the number of late deliveries. The attacker’s pure strategies are
all possible combinations of attack resources to edges, thus
|E|Ck strategies, where k = |S|.
Since the attacker has limited resources, they cannot afford
to ambush all locations all the time and instead focus on a
subset of “ideal” locations. The set of ideal ambush locations
corresponds to key routes that are frequented by couriers that
are especially useful in achieving the courier’s goals. The
courier not only wants to minimise transportation time but also
ensure their robustness to ambush, thus the courier may chose
from a range of routes hoping to avoid ambush on any of their
routes.
We can model the above hider-seeker game as a multi-round
zero-sum network interdiction game [20]. For a given a road
network G, the couriers seek to deliver goods on time whilst
hiding from the attacker. The attacker on the other hand is an
interdictor who aims to interdict (ambush) as many couriers
as possible.
Previous researchers [20], [15] considered disruptive attacks
on networks to be a single-round game. Such a model is
suitable for applications such as a conventional war, in which
the attacker has to expend a certain amount of effort to destroy
the defender’s command, control and communications, and one
wishes to estimate how much; or a single epidemic in which a
certain amount of resource must be spent to bring the disease
under control.
However, where attack and defense co-evolve in an adaptive
manner, then we have to consider a multi-round game [11]
which has significant explanatory power in many applications.
In our scenario, we are specifically interested in the various
Nash equilibria that might be possible with pure and mixed
strategies.
Each round is consists of two phases, the attack phase and
the defence phase. In the attack phase, the attacker deploys
attack assets on a subset of links of the network and ambushes
any courier they chance upon. The attacker selects edges
3according to an attack strategy described in Section III-A. The
attacker has full information about the roadway graph topology
but has no information about the delivery schedules of the
couriers.
In the defence phase, the couriers consider the impact of
the attack on their delivery efficiency and adapt by choosing a
defense strategy in accordance with available strategy choice
and information. A defense strategy is more efficient if for a
given attack strategy, it compels the attacker to increase the
number of attack assets to achieve the same level of network
disruption.
Similarly, an attack strategy is more efficient, if it either
achieves an increase in the number of successful ambushes
or forces the defender to expend more resources resulting in
deliveries beyond the delivery window.
To quantify attack efficiency, we measure the percentage
increase in late deliveries induced by the attack as well as the
increase in the delivery-completion time – i.e the time required
to complete deliveries per workday. We then examine the how
attack efficiency changes with variance in the delivery window
size (the maximum time that can elapse after delivery time,
before a delivery is classed as late); the impact of number of
attackers on the dynamics of attack-defense strategies.
III. ATTACKS AND DEFENCE STRATEGIES
We now discuss attack and defense strategies that the players
can adopt when playing the multi-round multi-player network
interdiction game.
A. Attacks
a) Random edge removal (Baseline): The first attack
strategy is the simplest of all, and is one of the most naive
attacks. A location is chosen as a suitable site for launching
service-denial attacks by choosing an edge from the corre-
sponding graph uniformly at random. This models the case
where an attacker has no other information to base their choice
and must choose an attack location with no intelligence to
hand.
b) Botgrep mincut detection: Thus far, we have estab-
lished that the mincut size establishes the theoretical upper
bound of defence. Therefore it is natural to consider mincut
detection techniques as an attack strategy. The traditional
description of a mincut from a graph theory perspective, is a
partition of the graph into two disjoint subsets that are joined
by a small (minimal) number of edges.
Botgrep [12] uses the relative mixing properties of sub-
graphs to identify edge cuts. Botgrep uses a special probability
transition matrix to implement the random walks, where the
transition probability between adjacent nodes i, j ∈ V is
min( 1di ,
1
dj
), as opposed to 1di from i to j in Markovian
random walks, where di is the degree of node i. Botgrep
uses short random walks to instrument mixing time within
a partition and to minimise the leakage of walks starting
from a partition. It then applies the probabilistic model from
SybilInfer to isolate edges which delineate the subset of the
graph where mixing speed changes. Thus the output of Botgrep
is various graph subsets with different mixing characteristics.
The motivation for Botgrep is as follows. While the notion
of a small-cut is a useful starting point, transport networks
may not necessarily contain small-cuts that partition the graph
into two or more components that are non-trivial in size. Thus
a complimentary approach to small-cut detection is offered
by the Botgrep technique which combines SybilInfer with
machine learning to identify sub-graphs with different mixing
characteristics.
c) Infomap cutset detection: Another technique that lever-
ages random walks is Infomap [14]. The intuition underlying
Infomap is that the fraction of time spent visiting a node
during a random walk can be used to uncover dense subgraphs
and the cutsets separating them. Unlike Botgrep which uses
short random walks, Infomap uses a few long random walks
to sample the graph, and computes node centralities as a
function of the number of visits during the random walk. This
information is used to search for edge cutsets partitioning the
graph using a deterministic greedy search algorithm.
B. Centrality attacks
A second class of attacks uses various measures of node
centrality to identify important nodes and proceeds to execute
service denial attacks on the node’s edges. The intuition
underlying these attacks is that attackers often try to disconnect
a network by destroying edges of important (central nodes).
a) Degree centrality: The most obvious form of a node’s
importance is the number of other nodes it is connected to. In
this case, the attacker targets edges of high degree nodes by
deploying attack resources on as many edges of the highest
degree nodes whilst constrained by the attack budget.
b) Eigen centrality: A related intuition of a node’s impor-
tance is not just the number of neighbouring nodes to but the
importance of the those nodes as well. A route that connects
important drug routes is even more important. Accordingly,
the eigen centrality of a node is algebraically computed as the
sum of the centralities of neighbouring nodes, which are in
turn connected to many others. The highest eigen centralities
correspond to nodes located in dense partitions. Accordingly,
the edge cutset comprises edges between the highest eigen-
centrality nodes.
c) Betweenness centrality: The principal goal of the at-
tacker is to deploy attack resources on edges that have the
highest chance of usage. The Betweenness centrality of a node
or an edge is the fraction of the shortest paths between all
possible pairs of origin-destination pairs that include it. Since
the defender wants to make deliveries within the constraints
of distance and time, the shortest path between nodes of the
tour would be a reasonable choice for the defender although
not the most resilient choice. Accordingly, the attacker targets
the set of edges with the highest Betweenness centrality in the
graph. High centrality edges usually form a cutset separating
dense subgraphs.
C. Modularity attacks
An alternate approach to mincut detection is offered by
the notion of modularity. Modularity techniques uncover min-
cuts that partition a graph into two or more modules. The
4intuition behind modularity mincut detection is to search for
graph components which have less edges than expected from
an equivalent baseline. The baseline is a random graph [8]
where the expected probability of an edge (i, j) is didj/|E|.
Modularity of graph G(V,E) is accordingly defined as:
Q =
∑
i,j
Aij − didj|E|
where A is the corresponding adjacency matrix of graph G. To
find the modularity mincut, a search algorithm (for modularity
optimisation) is used to detect edgesets that can partition
the graph into maximally modular subgraphs. A number of
optimisation approaches have been proposed.
a) Greedy-modularity: Clauset, Newman, and Moore [6]
propose a greedy algorithm to detect modularity mincuts.
Starting from a set of disconnected nodes, the edges of the
original graph are iteratively added in order to produce the
largest possible increase of the modularity at each step. It has
a complexity of O(NLog2N) on sparse topologies such as
road networks.
b) Eigen-modularity: Newman [13] proposed a spectral
optimisation approach to modularity maximisation. It com-
bines the intuitions of eigen centrality (node centrality is recur-
sively defined in terms of the centrality of its neighbours) with
modularity (expected vs actual edge probability distributions)
to isolate mincuts. This method works by calculating the most
significant eigenvector of the modularity matrix defined as
Bij = Aij − didj/|E|, where the first term is the adjacency
matrix and the second term is the expected edge probability
according to a randomised baseline. The graph is split into two
partitions based on the sign of the corresponding element in
the eigenvector, with the mincut being the set of edges across
the two partitions. When there is no underlying structure to
leverage, the eigenvector elements are of the same sign with the
method returning a null cutset ( as opposed to partitioning the
graph into two partitions regardless of underlying structure).
c) Hierarchical-modularity: Blondel et. al [3] propose
a hierarchical modularity optimisation technique for mincut
detection. It starts with a set of isolated nodes, each within
its own partition. Edges are added from the original graph in
order to produce the maximum possible increase in modularity.
In each iteration, edges and nodes may be reassigned for
merging with a different partition with which it achieves the
highest contribution to modularity. Each partition is replaced
replaced by supernodes, yielding a smaller weighted network.
The process is then iterated, until modularity (which is always
computed with respect to the original graph) does not increase
any further. This method offers a fair compromise between the
accuracy of the estimate of the modularity maximum, which
is better than that delivered by greedy techniques like the one
by Clauset et. al [6], and computational complexity, which is
essentially linear in the number of links of the graph.
D. Defense Strategies
1) Naive defenses: Our first defense strategy is the simplest
of all, and is one that has been proposed by past work in
network interdiction game [20], [15]. The defender navigates
via a randomly chosen route to reach destinations on a tour.
This is equivalent to the defender undertaking a Markovian
random walk to complete deliveries on time. The intuition
behind this defense is that by making random choices about
the next part of the route the defender can hope to maximise
the attacker’s uncertainty about the defender’s current location.
Sanjab et. al [15] also provide a proof of the optimality of this
defense.
The alternate obvious defense, is to enumerate all the dis-
joint paths between source-destination pairs and simply choose
one of the routes uniformly at random. One might hope that
there is enough redundancy within the network structure that
multiple (disjoint) path routes exist and that the defender gets
through most of the times and absorbs the delays on account
of any attacks (being towed out of the attack zone).
Nice as these ideas may seem in theory, we find they do
not work at all well in practice. In the Evaluation section,
(Section IV) we examine the effectiveness of naive defenses
against all the attack strategies and show that they are mostly
ineffective when examined against real datasets.
2) Sophisticated defenses: Better results can be expected by
designing defenses that are independent of attack strategies,
inspired by a common heuristic for solving zero-sum games.
The idea behind this approach is that the defender is indifferent
to attack moves, resulting in a lower-bound of defence utility.
a) Inverse centrality defence: Accordingly, our first non-
naive inverse centrality defense is a simple route-finding
strategy that avoids edges that are commonly used as part of
a shortest-path route between origin-destination pairs. And,
where the attacker might hope to achieve a high rate of
ambush. Specifically, the defender chooses routes to explicitly
avoid high-centrality edges. The defender scores each edge i, j
as a combination of Degree, Betweenness, and Eigen-centrality
over node j. Degree centrality is easily computed as a local
metric, and it is the most approximate form of a node’s signif-
icance CDij = Dj/|E|. Betweenness centrality is roughly the
proportion of paths a node lies on CBij =
∑
s6=j 6=t ρst(j)/ρst,
where ρst is the total number of paths between s and t
while ρst(j) is the number of st paths that include node j.
And, eigen centrality further incorporates the notion of node
significance as a function of being connected to significant
nodes CEij = C
E
j =
1
λ
∑
v∈V AjvC
E
v where λ is the largest
eigenvalue. A defender needs to balance between the various
types of centrality hence they compute the harmonic mean over
the three measures as follows:
Cij =
CDijC
B
ijC
E
ij
CDij+C
B
ij+C
E
ij
The defender then selects a route p that minimises the cumu-
lative weight of the scores within the path i.e Dp = mine∈p Ce.
b) Mixnet routing defence: Our next defense is more
sophisticated and derives from the theory of anonymous com-
munications as developed in traffic analysis literature [7]. The
defender assigns a random score (between 0 and 1) to each
edge in the graph, and computes a route that minimises the
cumulative weight of the route whilst completing the tour.
This model was initially presented in Danezis’ work on routing
anonymously in sparse networks cited above, so we refer to
it as Mixnet-shortest-path routing. In Danezis’ model, each
5mix-router routes messages by forwarding them to a random
neighbouring mix-router in order to maximise a global-passive
adversary’s uncertainty about a message’s location within a
mix network. This is strikingly similar to the defender’s
interest in resisting an attacker in our scenario. The Mixnet
defense promises significant improvement over Markov chain
routing proposed by previous work [15]. Mixnet routing not
only randomises the defender’s path but incorporates the notion
of latency awareness by choosing the route that minimises
the cumulative weight of (randomised) edge scores in the
route. This increases the likelihood of the defender meeting
delivery deadlines as compared to Markov chain routing. Since
the random scores are only known to the defender, and each
defender uses different edge scores, the attacker is unable to
effectively predict the edge a defender may be traveling. As
such Mixnet routing achieves a better balance between the
maximal adversarial uncertainty of Markov chain approach vs
the highly predictable shortest-path routing.
Variants of mixnet routing are possible that achieve a
different tradeoff between adversary uncertainty and latency.
For instance, a defender can follow (one of) the shortest
path for most part but toss a coin at intermediate nodes and
either continue to follow the shortest-path to the next hop, or
undertake an O(logn) random walk and regenerate a shortest-
path route from the end of the Markov chain to the next
destination on the tour. We will explore these variants in future
work.
IV. EVALUATION
We consider 12 different road networks corresponding to
popular cities across the world where an automated real-
time courier delivery system might be financially viable. The
security game described in Section II is played in a number
of rounds. Each round consists of an attack described in
Sections III-A– III-C, when deployed against each of the
defense strategies in Section III-D.
We simulate the interdiction game using real-world courier
workflows. Our analysis proceeds as follows. We initially
investigate the impact of each attack on the percentage of
late deliveries when shortest-path routing or a defense rout-
ing strategy is employed in a multi-round game whilst also
computing Nash equilibria. Nash equilibrium is the solution
to our adversarial game, in which an attacker and defender
choose a strategy while considering the opponents choice, and
neither benefits by changing their strategy.
Initially, we focus on the cities of London and Beijing for
which we have access to real courier traces. Subsequently, we
validate our findings at scale using graph data from ten other
cities.
Assumptions: We assume that the attacker has perfect in-
formation about the road network including traffic information
as this information is publicly available. The defender also has
access to this information, however the defender is not aware of
the attacker’s success rate on a particular route. This simulates
the scenario that defenders belong to different administrative
domains (i.e no single company owns them all) and hence
their strategy selection is not coordinated. Our goal is to
understand the lower bound for adversary success — the best-
case scenario for operators of fleets of driverless vehicles. We
assume that roads allow movement at the posted speed limits.
Consequently, our analysis is the most optimistic scenario for
developers of driverless vehicle technology, referred to as the
defender.
A. London dataset
Our first dataset contains real courier traces for the city of
London provided by eCourier (www.eCourier.co.uk). eCourier
provides this data through the Open Street Map (OSM) project
via a Creative Commons license. This dataset contains traces
of actual courier movement over an eight week period in 2007
corresponding to half a million deliveries. Each delivery is
associated with a delivery window which is a binary tuple
composed of the earliest delivery time and the latest acceptable
delivery time for the item. We also obtained the traffic and road
maps for London via Open Street Map and generated a road
network graph. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the delivery
windows and we can observe that the average delivery window
is about 2.2 hours. The average tour time in this dataset is ∼11
hours. We assume that each successful ambush causes a delay
of M = 10 minutes. This is an optimistic estimate for the
amount of time taken by a recovery vehicle to attend the scene
of the attack and recover the vehicle to a new location, outside
the attack zone. Longer delays would increase the delivery-
failure rates experienced by couriers.
Fig. 2: Delivery Window (London)
Attacks vs. Defenses: We simulated the multi-round ad-
versarial network interdiction game over 83330 delivery sched-
ules within this dataset. Figure 3shows the impact on delivery
time for every combination of nine attack strategies and three
defense strategies, within a multi-round game involving thirty
attackers (we justify this in a future section).
6Fig. 3: Late Deliveries vs. Attacks (London)
Figure 3 shows that most attacks on driverless vehicles
in London are effectively countered by shortest-path routing,
with the exception of the Betweenness and Botgrep attacks.
Betweenness attacks the edges which lie on the shortest-paths.
Consequently, it caused 70% of deliveries to be late when the
defender was using shortest-path routing. When the defender
switched to Mixnet routing, there were no late deliveries, hence
completely mitigating the attack. Mitigation is achieved by
the randomness of Mixnet routing, which switches from using
high-betweenness edges to leveraging edges that are a part of
mid to low conductance cuts, in order to route efficiently. From
Table I we can see that 65% of the late deliveries caused by the
Betweenness attack were critically delayed (by >50% of delay
window, eg 1.1 hours for London) when shortest-path routing
is used. The Inverse defense strategy reduced the amount of
critical delays by 10%, but Mixnet significantly reduced the
critical delays to 1% of the overall late deliveries. When the
attacker switches strategies from Betweenness to Botgrep, the
Mixnet defense, unlike its effectiveness in defending against
the Betweenness attack, was less effective compared to using
shortest-path routing. The reason for this is that Botgrep (in
common with other modularity-based techniques) attacks low
conductance cuts which are crucial to Mixnet’s routing effi-
ciency, as they enable connectivity between sparsely connected
localities. Interestingly, the Inverse centrality defense was the
most successful at reducing the amount of late deliveries
caused by the Botgrep attack. Overall, the amount of critical
delays caused by Botgrep is less than Betweenness. Even
though Mixnet is less effective against Botgrep compared to
Betweenness, it still reduces the amount of critically late delays
to 30% of the overall late deliveries, which is lower than if
shortest-path routing or Inverse is used.
Next, we allowed attackers and defenders to adapt to ea-
chother’s strategies. For the city of London, we found a pure
Nash equilibrium between the Botgrep attack strategy and
Mixnet defense strategy. When adaptation is allowed, and the
attacker employs the Betweenness attack, the defender can de-
ploy Mixnet to suitably counter it. The attacker could counter
the defender’s move with the Botgrep attack, maximising the
attacker’s payoff against Mixnet. However, no other strategy
increases the defender’s payoff, and no other attack improves
the attacker’s payoff, hence constituting a Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 4: Tour Time vs. Attacks (London)
Impact of attacks on tour time: We also measured the in-
creased costs imposed by defences my measuring the numbers
of hours a courier would need to work for. With no attacks,
the average working day is ∼11 hours, shown by the length of
an average tour when shortest-path routing is used (Figure 4).
Even where defenses are successful in minimising the impact
of attacks by ensuring the deliveries reach on time, the length
of the workday increases significantly which constitutes the
extra cost of resilience.
The Betweenness attack induces the largest increase in tour
time compared to all other attacks on this dataset. Although the
Inverse defense reduces the amount of late deliveries compared
to shortest-path routing shown in Figure 3, it induces a higher
tour length compared to shortest-path routing, with a worst-
case tour time of around 24 hours. Interestingly, the average
tour length when Mixnet is deployed against Betweenness is
only slightly more than when Mixnet routing is deployed under
no attack; we note however the the worst-case tour-length is
significantly higher under attack.
We also observed that Botgrep does not induce as many
late deliveries as the Betweenness attack, due to the overall
tour time being relatively similar. Although Mixnet reduces
7the amount of late deliveries compared to Inverse and shortest-
path routing for Botgrep, as shown in Figure 3, it incurs
a longer tour time. Interestingly, the tour time incurred by
Mixnet defense against Botgrep is similar to the tour time
for the Betweenness attack with shortest-path routing, which
caused the highest number of late deliveries in this dataset.
Fig. 5: Late Deliveries vs. Delay Window Increase (London)
Impact of delivery-window size: Next, we investigated
whether increasing the delivery window — the buffer times
available to a courier before a delivery is classed as late
— would reduce the number of late deliveries. The average
delivery window size within the dataset is 2.2 hours (Figure 2).
The results of increasing the delivery-window size are show in
Figure 5. Reductions in late deliveries start at around a 75%
increase in the delivery window, which is 3.85 hours. Reducing
the percentage of late deliveries to a serviceable level of 5%
of total deliveries, requires significant increase in the delay-
window size, which has implications for the numbers of hours
a courier needs to work for to complete the day’s work (or an
increase in the number of couriers). For example, in order to
reduce late deliveries from 75% to 10% for the Betweenness
attack, this would require a delivery window increase of around
250% or around 5.5 hours per delivery.
Impact of attacker strength: To investigate the impact of
the number of attackers units on late deliveries, we controlled
for the number of attack resources available to the attacker. We
assume these attack units are coordinated by a single attacker
who coordinates the placement and strategies of all the attack
units using a command-and-control network. As shown in Fig-
ure 6, as the number of attackers increases, increasing numbers
of edges get attacked which result in increasing delivery times.
We identified that on average, significant increases in late
deliveries occur between 10 and 30 attackers. As well as this,
attacks other than Betweenness and Botgrep show minimal
or no increases in late deliveries, regardless of how many
attackers are deployed. From these observations, we decided to
run our previous experiments with a baseline of 30 attackers.
Fig. 6: Late Deliveries vs. # Attackers (London)
B. Beijing dataset
Our second dataset for the city of Beijing is two orders
of magnitude larger than the London courier dataset. This
dataset contains traces generated by 30000 couriers over a
period of three months between making a combined total of
75 million deliveries. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the
delivery windows and we can observe that the average delivery
window is about 30 minutes. The average tour time in this
dataset is ∼4 hours, owing to a large number of couriers being
engaged for a fraction of a working day.
Attacks vs. Defenses: Figure 8 shows that most attacks
had some degree of impact on the amount of late deliveries
when shortest-path routing was used. Specifically, the Be-
tweenness, Eigen-modularity and Botgrep attacks were suc-
cessful in inducing high rates of late deliveries. The Between-
ness attack is effectively mitigated by the Mixnet defense strat-
egy, similar to London. Unlike London, the Inverse defense
strategy incurs a higher percentage of late deliveries when
employed against the Betweenness attack than if shortest-path
routing is used. This is because London has higher redundancy
in terms of the number of disjoint shortest paths within the road
network. With an increased number of attackers running the
betweenness attack, London can be expected to show a similar
trend i.e Inverse performs worse than shortest-path routing.
This does not mean there is not enough redundancy between
origin-destination pairs in Beijing, however routing techniques
based on shortest-paths cannot locate such routes. Mixnet
routing however can do so. Similar to the London dataset,
the Mixnet strategy also significantly reduces the amount of
critical delays. This indicates the importance of leveraging low-
8Lon Bei Bris Bham Cam Gla Eburgh Del Chi Bos
Shortest 65 94 85 96 100 94 81 98 34 97
Betweenness Inverse 55 99 88 98 100 88 82 97 40 72
Mixnet 1 10 25 2 75 6 1 3 1 0
Shortest 3 22 18 9 54 15 7 7 5 13
Random Inverse 7 27 18 3 45 9 13 13 8 13
Mixnet 7 24 16 6 51 15 13 12 8 9
Shortest 0 4 25 0 15 31 11 2 0 0
Degree Inverse 1 2 21 3 8 35 4 4 0 0
Mixnet 0 1 54 0 3 13 4 1 0 0
Shortest 0 3 32 0 17 2 1 0 0 0
Eigen-C Inverse 0 2 42 0 12 5 0 10 0 0
Mixnet 0 1 77 0 9 9 66 14 0 0
Shortest 0 38 31 1 58 10 20 12 4 45
Infomap Inverse 2 59 34 0 46 12 9 9 2 42
Mixnet 14 4 30 7 50 52 11 40 2 6
Shortest 5 86 76 11 95 35 26 85 13 4
Hierarchy Inverse 7 77 69 23 94 31 23 83 14 5
Mixnet 3 54 62 4 83 50 27 68 38 3
Shortest 5 86 76 11 95 35 26 85 13 4
Greedy Inverse 7 77 69 23 94 31 23 83 14 5
Mixnet 3 54 62 4 83 50 27 68 38 4
Shortest 0 72 2 3 82 0 32 39 2 0
Eigen-M Inverse 1 74 3 5 81 2 27 30 5 2
Mixnet 0 19 2 2 80 1 15 60 5 6
Shortest 46 68 76 14 83 19 59 64 26 3
Botgrep Inverse 36 74 77 15 82 27 48 57 18 5
Mixnet 30 21 73 13 89 47 44 9 62 1
TABLE I: % of Critically Delayed Late Deliveries
Fig. 7: Delivery Window (Beijing)
conductance paths rather than shortest-path routing to construct
Fig. 8: Late Deliveries vs. Attacks (Beijing)
better defences.
9In both London and Beijing, attacks leveraging betweenness
centrality and low-conductance cuts are fairly successful, while
Mixnet is the only serviceable defense. Table I, shows that
the Betweenness attack causes 94% of late deliveries to be
critically delayed and 99% of these delays to be critical when
the Inverse defense is employed. Modularity-based attacks also
induce high percentages of critically delayed late deliveries.
High percentages of critical delays are induced by the majority
of attacks with the exception of Degree and Eigen-Centrality,
which is unlike the London dataset where high percentages
of critically delayed late deliveries are only induced by the
Betweenness and Botgrep attacks. Modularity attacks target
low conductance cuts which Mixnet uses to improve routing
efficiency. We expect to observe a higher amount of late
deliveries when Mixnet is deployed against modularity-based
attacks. This is demonstrated by the Hierarchy and Greedy
attacks in Figure 8, with Mixnet incurring a lower percentage
of late deliveries compared to the Inverse defense. In regards to
conductance-based attacks, we find that Botgrep is a successful
attack in London whereas Hierarchical-modularity is the most
successful attack in Beijing.
As with London, we also found a pure Nash equilibrium
in Beijing between the Hierarchical-modularity attack and
Mixnet defense.
Fig. 9: Tour Time vs. Attacks (Beijing)
Impact of attacks on tour time: Next, we investigated the
impact of the different attack strategies on the tour time of
couriers. From Figure 9 we can observe that the average tour
time for a working day is ∼4 hours, shown by the length of an
average tour when shortest-path routing is used with no attack.
Only a minimal increase in tour time is observed when defense
strategies are employed with no attack strategy used. Similar
to the London dataset, the Betweenness attack significantly
increases the tour time of a courier to around 11 hours when no
defensive-routing strategy is used. The Inverse defense further
increases this, incurring a tour time of around 18 hours. Mixnet
performs well to keep the tour time low, showing only a small
increase compared to when it is employed against no attack
strategy. From Figure 9, we can also identify that on average
modularity-based attacks significantly increase the tour time
compared to the average tour time by at least 50%. Mixnet
however manages to reduce the tour time incurred by the
modularity-based attacks by around the same amount.
Fig. 10: Late Deliveries vs. Delay Window Increase (Beijing)
Impact of variable delivery windows: The next experi-
ment we ran on this dataset was to investigate the impact of
variable delivery windows on the amount of late deliveries.
Figure 10 shows us that significant decreases in the amount
of late deliveries only occur after at least a 100% in the
existing delivery window. From Figure 7, we identified that the
average delivery window was 30 minutes for this dataset. From
our previous observation, we can deduce that a substantial
reduction in late deliveries will be seen with a delivery window
of about one hour. For an ideal amount of late deliveries, such
as around 10% like the London dataset, an increase of at least
250% to the delay window (2.5 hours) is required. However,
we can observe that attacks such as Betweenness still incur
a very high percentage of late deliveries even with a 250%
increase in the delivery window. This suggests that increasing
the delivery window alone does not resolve the attack.
Impact of the number of attackers: Our final experiment
on this dataset was to investigate the impact of the number
of attackers on late deliveries. From Figure 11 we can see
that on average, there are significant increases between 1 and
30 attackers. The baseline is derived by observing how many
attackers are required to induce significant failure rates using
any attack with shortest-path routing. We observe that Botgrep,
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Eigen-Modularity, Greedy modularity, and Betweenness are
very successful even at a fairly low attacker count of 5–10
attackers. However, to keep our experiments consistent with
the London dataset for comparison, we decided to use the same
baseline of 30 attackers, as it covers the significant increases
in late deliveries for attacks on averages.
Fig. 11: Late Deliveries vs. # Attackers (Beijing)
C. Synthetic dataset
Our third dataset, is composed of synthetic courier traces
combined with real road network data generated via OSM data
for the following cities: Birmingham (UK), Boston (USA),
Bristol (UK), Cambridge (UK), Chicago (USA), Delhi (India),
Edinburgh (UK) and Glasgow (UK). The purpose of this
dataset is to expand our analysis beyond London and Beijing.
To generate synthetic traces, we use the London database as a
basis. The number of couriers are maintained but the locations
are randomised in a distance-preserving manner i.e the distance
between consecutive locations is identical on both the synthetic
and real job cards for any courier. In the London dataset, each
courier has a job card created on a per-day basis, that lists
the delivery locations, times, and a delivery window which
serves as buffer to indicate the maximum possible lateness
allowed. We replace the first location on the card with a
location from the city of interest, chosen uniformly at random.
The subsequent locations on the card are replaced with another
random location such that the travel time between consecutive
locations on the synthetic card is the same as real job card. The
delivery window size (difference between the latest possible
delivery time and the window start time) is also maintained
the same as the London dataset. A job is marked late if it is
delivered beyond the maximum allowable delivery period.
Impact of Attack and Defense Strategies: We first eval-
uated the effectiveness of the different attack strategies on
the percentage of late deliveries for each of the cities in our
synthetic dataset, as well as the effectiveness of these attacks
when a defense strategy is employed, with the results shown in
Figure 12. Overall, we observed that the Betweenness attack
was the most successful attack on all the synthetic traces. For
the Bristol, Birmingham and Edinburgh datasets, we noticed
that the Inverse defense incurred a higher percentage of late
deliveries compared to shortest-path routing, the same outcome
shown in our results for Beijing. In our previous datasets, we
observed that modularity-based attacks caused a large number
of datasets but were mitigated by Mixnet. We noticed that
for some cities in our synthetic dataset, such as Glasgow
(Figure 12(d)), Mixnet performs exceedingly worse as low-
conductance edges across dense clusters are identified and
targeted by modularity-based attacks.
Similar to London, our results on the Birmingham dataset
in Figure 12(b) show that the majority of attacks are not that
effective. For example, the degree centrality attack has no
impact on late deliveries even when no defense is employed.
Interestingly, for most cities in our synthetic dataset, Eigen-
Centrality attacks have little or no impact on late deliveries.
More specifically, our results for Edinburgh in Figure 12(e)
show that Eigen-Centrality with shortest-path routing incurs a
very small number of late deliveries, but Mixnet causes ∼70%
of late deliveries. To investigate this further, we looked at the
number of critically delayed late deliveries for these cities
shown in Table I. We identified that Mixnet causes 66% of the
late deliveries for the Eigen-Centrality attack on Edinburgh to
be critically delayed. Overall, we observed that for all cities
in our synthetic dataset, with the exception of Chicago and
Boston, the modularity-based attacks incur the highest amounts
of critical delays. The results from the table do show that for
all cities, Mixnet reduces the amount of critical delays —
however, not substantially. This means that while Mixnet is
able to mitigate the attack to some extent, these cities have
relatively lower numbers of low-conductance cuts (ρ < 0.076)
across localities which restricts the number of redundant paths
available to Mixnet whilst under attack.
Effect of Attack Strategies on Tour Time: Our next exper-
iment on the synthetic dataset was to investigate the impact
on attack strategies on tour time. Figure 13 shows the effect
of attacks on tour time. Overall, we observed that for most
cities, the average tour time for a working day is between 8
and 10 hours. Boston has a slightly higher average tour time of
∼12 hours. The average tour time is shown by the length of an
average tour when shortest-path routing is used with no attack.
Interestingly, we identified that increases in tour time correlates
with the percentage of late deliveries shown in Figure 12. For
example, in Figure 12(e) our results show that Mixnet incurs
a high amount of late deliveries when deployed against Eigen-
Centrality. In Figure 13(e) we can see the same increase in
tour time when Mixnet is used, with the tour time increasing
from ∼10 hours to nearly 20 hours. The Betweenness attack
also incurs the highest tour time for all cities, with Mixnet
effectively reducing the tour time as well as the amount of
late deliveries.
Impact of Delivery Window Size: Our final experiment on
this dataset was to investigate the impact of the size of delivery
windows on the amount of late deliveries. As previously
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(a) Bristol, UK (b) Birmingham, UK
(c) Cambridge, UK (d) Glasgow, UK
(e) Edinburgh, UK (f) Delhi, India
(g) Chicago, USA (h) Boston, USA
Fig. 12: Effect on % of Late Deliveries for Attack Strategies
described, the synthetic dataset is based off the London dataset
such that the delivery window size is maintained the same.
Therefore we can state that for all cities in our synthetic
dataset, the average delivery window is 2.2 hours. The results
of this experiment are shown in Figure 14. For all cities we
observed that the betweenness attack, regardless of the defense
strategy, incurred the highest percentage of late deliveries even
with an increase in the delivery window. For all cities, we
noticed that substantial decreases in late deliveries only occur
after in increase in delivery window of around 100% (4.4
hours). As well as this, Mixnet also substantially reduces the
percentage of late deliveries in all cities and in some cases
almost reducing the percentage of late deliveries to nearly 0%
such as in Boston (Figure 14(h)). For most cities however,
we would consider an ideal amount of late deliveries to be
around 10% like with London and Beijing. From the results we
can deduce that to achieve the ideal amount of late deliveries,
we would require at least a 200% increase in the delivery
window (6.6 hours). However for most cities, the Betweenness
attack still incurs over 60% of late deliveries even with a 200%
increase in the delivery window, suggesting that increasing the
delivery window alone will not resolve this attack.
D. Discussion
Driverless vehicles are expected to be foundational com-
ponents of future transport systems. Our results show that
the topology of road networks plays an important role in
the security of driverless vehicles. Thus it is important to
consider network topology rather than solely focusing on the
vehicles. We have shown that any physical-proximity attack on
a driverless vehicle can be carried out at scale, if the attacker
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Fig. 13: Tour Time vs. Attacks
exploits certain “ideal” ambush locations. By exploiting these
locations, attackers can transform host-level attacks into a
practical attack that can target one or more fleets at the scale
of an entire city. We found such locations in each of the twelve
road networks we analysed.
We found that the mainstay of routing techniques used
by driverless vehicles – shortest path routing (which solely
focuses on efficiency) – is highly vulnerable to betweenness
centrality attacks in all the cities we examined. As described
in Section III-A, the betweenness centrality of an edge is the
fraction of the shortest paths that include the edge. Thus the
edges with highest betweenness centrality are ideal ambush
sites against couriers using the shortest path routing strategy.
In contrast, mixnet routing performs significantly better
than shortest path routing. Mixnet combines the notions of
routing efficiency with randomness. Randomising a courier’s
route leads to greater uncertainty on the attackers part since
the courier occasionally seeks alternatives to shortest paths
to the next destination. In comparison with shortest path
routing, mixnet routing reduces the number of edges with high
betweenness centrality in the path, thus reducing the delivery-
failure. In general, we found that delivery failure rate for
mixnet was half the failure rate for shortest path routing, in
most of the cities we evaluated.
In many cities, none of the defences produced service-
able results – even after deploying randomised defences –
a coordinated attack by approximately 10–30 attackers, can
cause between 20% to 50% of deliveries to be delayed, at
a minimum, considering the application of Mixnet routing
strategy. In cities like Beijing as few as 8 attackers are
able to cause significant levels of disruption. An increase in
the number of attackers reduces delivery rates approximately
linearly as the number of attackers.
Switching the routing strategy from the default (short-
est path) to a more resilient Mixnet helps, however further
switching does not help in most cases. We found pure Nash
equilibriums between attacks and defences in London (Mixnet
vs Botgrep), Beijing (Mixnet vs Hierarchical modularity), and
Boston (Mixnet vs Random). An equilibrium predicts the
strategic behaviour of attackers and defenders, and specifically
that switching from these strategy combinations is unlikely
under the assumption of rationality.
For Bristol, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Delhi, Glasgow,
Chicago, and Cambridge (UK), we found mixed-strategy equi-
libriums. This is due to a cyclical disruption in the dominance
relationships between attack and defense strategy combina-
tions. For instance, in the case of Edinburgh (UK), consider a
courier who starts off using shortest path routing to minimise
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Fig. 14: Late deliveries vs Delivery Window Increase
their transportation time. The attacker exploits the couriers’ use
of high-betweenness edges and attacks them using between-
ness centrality, which is successfully countered by the courier
using mixnet routing which leverages high-conductance cuts
instead of shortest paths to minimise transportation time hence
being robust to betweenness attack. Subsequently, the attacker
switches to Eigen centrality attack, which significantly in-
creases the %late-deliveries under mixnet routing because of
the high correlation between conductance-cut edges (used by
mixnet) and high eigen-centrality edges. As a response, the
courier can switch to leveraging the shortest path routing or
inverse centrality defense, to shift from using high-conductance
edges. The attacker naturally switches to betweenness central-
ity, thus completing a cycle – (Betweenness, Mixnet, Eigen-C,
Inverse, Betweenness, . . . ), which iterates. The cycle is stable
since the dynamics of attack and defense constitutes a nash
equilibrium.
We observe from the late delivery rates in figures 12, 8,
and 3, that in all cases, the effectiveness of inverse centrality
defense is not very different from that of the shortest path
routing, against the betweenness centrality attack. To be clear
inverse centrality is not the inverse of betweenness centrality.
It is the harmonic mean of three edge centralities including
betweenness. However, since road networks show low diversity
in degree centrality, the resulting edge choice for a route is a
function of betweenness (i.e shortest path) and eigen centrality
(edge importance as a function of other edges). Here between-
ness plays the major role as evidenced by the similar damage
sustained by couriers using either shortest-path routing or
inverse-centrality routing whilst under a betweenness centrality
attack.
Many of the Nash equilibriums we observed for the various
cities we analysed are contain combinations of attacks and
defenses that occur together frequently. See figures 12, 8, and
3. For instance, a combination of Botgrep and Betweenness
attacks are found in an equilibrium with a combination of
defense strategies of shortest path and mixnet routing. To
understand why this occurs, we need to consider why some
attacks are good at covering a broad spectrum of the attack
surface. Efficient routing in so far as the strategies considered
in this paper are based on two intuitions: shortest paths and
high-conductance paths. Couriers using shortest path routing
strategy are ambushed with high probability by attackers
deployed at high-betweenness locations, and counter it by
switching to mixnet routing that leverages a combination of
min cuts, path randomisation, and shortest paths. However, the
attacker can in turn counter that defense using botgrep which is
specifically designed to uncover high-conductance cuts using
a two-stage random walk method. This forces the courier to
revert to the shortest-path routing, and the cycle continues.
While some defences can be effective against some attacks
many challenges remain. Our work demonstrates that the well
known shortest-path routing strategy will fail miserably, with
delayed deliveries approaching 80–100% in most cities we
analysed, with the exception of Chicago, which has a lattice
road-structure that offers slightly better resilience (60% late
deliveries). This reduction arises from the fact that outside
of high betweenness centrality roads, the edges of the lattice
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provide a large number of alternate paths between origin-
destination pairs with little diversity in their importance.
E. Tactical aspects
Previous work has shown that host-level attacks can be
mounted via sensor saturation [21], [18], [16] or by exploiting
the impact of adversarial inputs on machine-learning tech-
niques [9], [17], [10], [19], [4]. Up until now, no techniques
have been proposed as to how attacks on individual hosts can
be scaled. However, network effects of the road systems might
start to change that as attackers realise they only need to
be located at a fraction of possible locations to consistently
ambush their targets.
While the strategic aspects favour the attacker, do the tactical
options exist to complement it? This question can be answered
by considering whether the cost of using jamming equipment,
amongst others, in a deployed attack unit is economically
viable when deployed to disrupt a fleet of courier vehicles.
From our results, we know that an adversary only requires 25–
30 mobile attack units, in order to “cover” an entire city. Com-
mercial GPS jamming equipment retails for around £2000 and
a laser gun mounted on a high-precision industrial robot arm
such as a UR3 device retails for around £9000, with cheaper
alternatives available in the market. This constitutes a burden
of approximately £9000 per attack unit excluding the mounting
platform, adding up to a total budget of roughly £250,000. The
costs of moving the equipment can be minimised by slightly
increasing the total budget to statically occupy ambush points
defined by either high-betweenness or high-conductance edges.
In terms of the damage inflicted, the losses accruing from
failed promises to deliver on time has some link to repurchase
intentions. According to [5], the inability to deliver on time just
once can result in a reduction of 14% of current purchasers
submitting a future order. An inability to deliver on time
twice reduces the customer base by a cumulative total of 26%.
Conservatively, assuming this results in the loss of an order of
magnitude lower loss in revenues from one city, it would mean
an indicative loss of 2-3% of revenue per city. Depending on
the volume of trade (given that some retailers filed tax returns
of global revenues of three figure billions of dollars) potential
losses could run into millions of pounds in the top-1000 large
cities where most of the business is done. We note however
that these are very rough calculations to examine the viability
of tactical options and should be considered no more than a
sanity check. It is also worth noting that the impact of late
deliveries on customer satisfaction and future trade depends
on cultural and personal attributes, therefore generalising on
the basis of a scholarly study focused on any small part of the
world is not advisable.
V. RELATED WORK
The game-theoretic background to the problem at hand lies
in the search game within predator-prey games, also known as
hider-seeker games. This is a zero sum game between a single
predator and a single mobile prey. The predator and prey move
about in a search region. The game ends with positive payoff to
the predator when it meets the prey. As a bio-inspired example,
the blancardella wasp finds larvae by searching for visible
evidence of leaf-mining. Wasps are attracted by the appearance
of holes or other leaf deformation created bythe leaf-mining
larvae. The game begins when the wasp lands on the leaf to
search for the larvae, who in turn is alerted by the vibrations
caused by the landing wasp triggering evasive behaviour by
larvae. When the wasp encounters a feeding hole, it repeatedly
inserts its ovipositor violently in the area to ambush the prey.
The game ends either with the wasp paralysing the larvae or
abandoning the leaf. The formalisation of this problem is well
studied within pursuit-evasion games [1].
A particular form of hider-seeker game called an interdiction
game [20] which was originally developed to understand and
intercept drug smuggling in the 90s. In an interdiction game,
one or more smugglers (hiders) attempt to traverse a path
between two nodes on a network while the police (seeker)
patrol certain routes intensively to interdict smugglers. Both
the players are intelligent and adapt to eachother to avoid being
predictable. Our work uses Wood’s game formulation as the
starting point.
Work on security games and robotic patrolling has focused
on concrete applications of path-disruption games [2]. Here the
hider attempts to reach a well known target whereas the seeker
wishes to prevent that. The dynamics of attack and defence
strategies is well understood in the static target problem —
a static target is appropriately ring fenced by the defender
via a defence-in-depth approach. In our multi-party network
interdiction game, the targets are multiple as well as being
dynamic as courier deliveries involve dropoffs at numerous
locations.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is significant interest in using autonomous or driver-
less vehicles to achieve cost reductions in transport logistics of
parcel deliveries and taxis to enable point-to-point transport.
A major barrier to this vision is a holistic understanding of the
systemic challenges across connectivity, mobility, and security.
In addition to carrying out reliable data acquisition through
redundant sensors, securing vehicular communications, and the
host (vehicle) itself, we need carefully designed redundancy
within vehicle routing infrastructure. And, routing techniques
that can leverage them via adversarially-resilient routing algo-
rithms. As a first step in this direction, we have carried out
the first systematic analysis of the attack and defense strategy
space. We showed that launching targeted attacks in an optimal
fashion is an NP-hard problem. We then applied approximation
algorithms to study the dynamics of attack-defense efficiency
by constructing the adversarial TSP game. We found that
most of these attacks were very effective against the shortest-
path routing technique which is a commonly used routing
technique, while Mixnet routing was the best defense strategy.
Our analysis of the adversarial TSP game identified several
Nash Equilibria which offers a predictive view of which attack
and defense strategies are important. While the study is not
perfect in that we haven’t considered the effects of congestion,
we offer a lower bound of adversarial success as congestion
will further reduce the fraction of on-time deliveries. There
15
are several avenues for future work. First, our analysis would
be improved by considering the effects of congestion. Second,
our analysis may be improved by considering temporal aspects
(observing how variance on the traffic graphs impacts our
results). Finally, we do not attempt to address the challenging
problem of providing countermeasures i.e how to build redun-
dancy into the road network and designing defensive-routing
schemes that can leverage that redundancy when needed.
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